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I. INTRODUCTION
Wrongful discharge law has been an area of tremendous growth in
California. Recent decisions on both the supreme court1 and appel-
late court 2 levels have dramatically limited the traditional concept of
employment at will. As recent jury verdicts have indicated,3 an ill-
advised termination may result in employer liability amounting to
hundreds of thousands of dollars. In light of the increased risk of
wrongful discharge liability, it is essential that employers stay in-
formed of current laws and take preventative steps to reduce the risk
of possible litigation.
This article will summarize the evolution of wrongful discharge
from the traditional concept of employment at will to current judicial
limitations of that doctrine. Second, various methods by which an
employer can reduce the risk of incurring wrongful discharge liabil-
ity will be discussed. Once an employer has a working knowledge of
the basic legal principles, a few changes in its employment policies
may greatly decrease the risk of litigation.
II. TRADITIONAL EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
California has traditionally followed the "at will" doctrine in its
treatment of employment termination. The at will doctrine, as codi-
fied,4 states that "an employee could be fired for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all." 5 The doctrine was developed following
1. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
2. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981);
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
3. See infra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
4. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1985). "An employment, having no speci-
fied term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Em-
ployment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one
month." Id.
5. Baxter & Wohl, Wrongful Termination Lawsuits: The Employers Finally
Win a Few, 10 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 258, 259 (1984).
California cases which have applied the at will doctrine include: Swaffield v. Uni-
the Civil War during a period of rapid industrial development which
fostered a wide-spread laissez faire economic attitude.6 The prevail-
ing interest concerned employers' ability to run their businesses as
they saw fit.7 As a result, employers traditionally have had unfet-
tered discretion to terminate their employees at will. However, this
may be limited by contract8 or statute.9
versal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1969); Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224
Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964); Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6
Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
6. For a more complete history of the employment at will doctrine, see Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1416-19 (1967); Blackburn, Restricted Em-
ployer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment at Will, 17 AM. Bus.
L.J. 467 (1980); Krauskopf, Employment Discharge: Survey and Critique of the Modern
At Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189 (1983); Note, Protecting At Will Employees
Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L.
REV. 1816, 1824-28 (1980).
7. Comment, Wrongful Termination of Employees at Will: The California
Trend, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 259, 284 (1983).
8. Employees could always protect their employment status through an express
contractual agreement limiting the employer's ability to terminate the employee.
However, courts found such contractual agreements invalid unless supported by some
consideration other than the services to be rendered. See, e.g., Levy v. Bellmar Enters.,
241 Cal. App. 2d 686, 690, 50 Cal. Rptr. 842, 844-45 (1966) ("assuming that appellant
and respondents had entered into a direct oral or written contract . . . nevertheless
such contract, being for an indefinite period, might be terminated by either party un-
less supported by some further consideration bargained for and given by appellant in
addition to his rendition of the services required of him by the employment contract
itself."); Lynch v. Gagnon, 96 Cal. App. 512, 519, 274 P. 584, 586 (1929) ("employment
based upon a consideration can only be rightfully terminated under conditions which
render it reasonably just and proper to do so"); Brown v. National Elec. Works, 168
Cal. 336, 143 P. 606 (1914) (agreement by employer, in consideration of a purchase of
certain shares of stock at a fixed price, to employ purchaser at a stated salary, without
specifying duration of employment, was held to imply a continuance of employment
for a reasonable time, and contract would be breached if employee is discharged sooner
without good cause).
9. Modernly, there are several federal statutory limitations on the employer's
discretion to terminate at will. See, e.g., Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29
U.S.C. § 158 (1982) (prohibits employment discrimination for engaging in or refusing to
engage in concerted activities, or for asserting rights under the Act); Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1982) (prohibits employment discrimi-
nation for asserting rights under the Act); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2
(1982) (prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex,
or religious preference, or for asserting rights under the Act); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982) (prohibits employment
discrimination based on age regarding employees aged 40 to 70 years, or for asserting
rights under the Act); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)
(1982) (prohibits discrimination for asserting rights under the Act); Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1141 (1982) (prohibits employ-
ment discrimination for asserting rights under the Act, and prohibits discharge of
employees to prevent vesting of pension rights); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a)
(1982) (prohibits discharge of employees initiating or testifying in proceedings against
their employers for violating the Act); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees because of garnishment for any one in-
debtedness); Jury Systems Improvements Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1982) (prohib-
its discharge of employees for jury service); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42
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The at will doctrine began to erode, however, during the mid-
1900's. This erosion was prompted by the inequality of bargaining
power between the employee and the employer, and by the growing
economic dependence of the employee on the employer.10 The first
major inroad into employment at will occurred as early as 1959 in the
case of Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local
396.11 The court espoused a "public policy" exception to the at will
doctrine thereby prohibiting termination of an employee for refusing
to commit perjury.12
The at will doctrine was further limited in 1972 when a court of
appeal recognized an implied covenant against discharge except for
U.S.C. § 5851 (1982) (prohibits discharge of employees who participate in proceedings
in furtherance of the Act); Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1980, 45
U.S.C. § 441(a), (b)(1) (1982) (prohibits employers from discharging employees who file
complaints or initiate proceedings relating to enforcement of federal railroad safety
laws, or who refuse to work based on reasonable belief that conditions are dangerous).
Additionally, there are various state statutory restrictions on the employer's ability
to terminate employees at will. See, e.g., California Fair Employment and Housing
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985) (prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical
handicap, medical condition, marital status, or sex, or as to persons over forty years of
age, based on age, or for asserting rights under the statute); Workers Compensation
and Insurance Act, CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a (West Supp. 1985) (prohibits discrimination
against employees who are injured in the course of employment); California Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1973, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 6310, 6312 (West Supp. 1985)
(prohibits retaliation for complaining to a governmental agency as to safety conditions
or initiating or testifying in a proceeding regarding safety violations); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 432.2 (West Supp. 1985) (misdemeanor to condition employment or continued em-
ployment on taking a polygraph or lie detector test).
10. As employment became more and more scarce, employees became more and
more dependent upon employers for their economic security. As such, nonunionized
employees lacked the bargaining power to protect themselves from unjust dismissal.
Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Discharge-A Quadrennial Assessment of
the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 (1984).
Additionally, with the advent of pension plans, retirement benefits, and other sen-
iority related benefits, individual employees "are no longer separate economic units
with complete mobility and freedom of decision." Comment, supra note 7, at 264-65
(footnote omitted).
11. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959). In this case, the union discharged
Petermann, one of its employees, immediately following the employee's refusal to
make false statements before a legislative committee investigating the union. Id. at
187, 344 P.2d at 26.
12. The court stated:
[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public pol-
icy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee,
whether the employment be for a designated or unspecified duration, on the
ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act specifically en-
joined by statute.
Id. at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
good cause.1 3 It must be noted, however, that the court found in the
language of the written employment contract that the employee was
to be terminated only for cause. 14 Similarly, in Rabago-Alvarez v.
Dart Industries, Inc.,15 the court recognized an implied covenant
against discharge without good cause where the employee had left a
position of sixteen years in reliance on the employer's assurances of
permanent employment as long as her work efforts were
satisfactory.16
These initial encroachments into the employment at will doctrine
led to three landmark cases which created potentially wide-reaching
exceptions to at will employment in California.17 These three theo-
ries are: (1) violation of public policy,' 8 (2) implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing,19 and (3) implied-in-fact promise.20
III. PUBLIC POLICY THEORY
The most widely accepted theory of wrongful termination is based
upon the public policy cause of action.21 Tameny v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co.,22 the first of the three landmark cases, stands for the the-
ory that an employee who has been terminated for reasons contrary
to public policy may institute an action against the employer sound-
ing in tort.23 In Tameny, a public policy violation resulted from the
13. Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972).
In Drzewiecki, the plaintiff was terminated after refusing to agree to a reduction in his
salary after investing his time and energy into making the business profitable. Id at
700, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
14. Id. at 705, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 175. The court placed emphasis on the agreement
between the parties that plaintiff would not be terminated unless he "improperly con-
ducted the business." Id. at 704, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
15. 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976).
16. The court stated:
contracts of employment in California are terminable only for good cause if
either of two conditions exist: (1) the contract was supported by consideration
independent of the services to be performed by the employee for his prospec-
tive employer; or (2) the parties agreed, expressly or impliedly, that the em-
ployee could be terminated only for good cause.
Id. at 96, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
17. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980) (public policy exception); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d
443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (implied covenant of good faith); Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981) (implied-in-fact promise).
18. See in fra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
21. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 7.
22. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980). In Tameny, plaintiff
had been employed for fifteen years as a retail sales representative for defendant in
charge of management relations between various service station dealers in his terri-
tory. Plaintiff claimed he was discharged from this position for refusing to participate
in defendant's illegal scheme to fix retail gasoline prices. ML at 169, 610 P.2d at 1331,
164 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
23. The court stated that "if the cause of action arises from a breach of a promise
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employer discharging the employee for refusing to engage in an ille-
gal price fixing scheme. Thus, the Tameny court created a "cause of
action where there is 'bad cause,' but not where there is 'no
cause.' "24 The plaintiff has the burden of proving that the em-
ployer's motive for the discharge was wrongful, i.e., that it contra-
venes public policy.2 5
Although violation of public policy has become a widely recognized
cause of action, the question remains how far the courts are willing
to go in deciding what constitutes such a violation. In almost all cases
which have recognized the public policy theory, plaintiffs have been
able to show that the theory has been embodied in some statutory au-
thority.26 However, the courts in both Tameny and Petermann sug-
gested that a cause of action may exist absent such statutory
support.27
In Tameny, the court also suggested that an employee may have a
tort cause of action for an employer's breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. However, the court refused to decide
the issue, relying instead on the public policy exception to the at will
doctrine.28 Later that year, however, the appellate court in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,29 took the lead from Tameny and estab-
lished such a cause of action.
IV. IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has rarely been
set forth in the contract, the action is ex contractu, but if it arises from a breach of
duty growing out of the contract it is ex delicto." Id. at 175, 610 P.2d at 1334, 164 Cal.
Rptr. at 843-44 (emphasis in original) (citing Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 249
P.2d 257, 260 (1952), which, in turn, quoted Peterson v. Sherman, 68 Cal. App. 2d 706,
711, 157 P.2d 863, 866 (1945)).
The prohibition against discharging an employee for refusing to violate a law or stat-
ute stems from a duty imposed by law to promote the public welfare, not from an ex-
press or implied contractual agreement between the parties. Comment, supra note 7,
at 266.
24. Miller & Estes, Recent Judicial Limitations on the Right to Discharge: A Cali-
fornia Trilogy, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 65, 82-83 (1982) (citing Payne v. Western & Atlantic
R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (overruled on other grounds)).
25. Miller & Estes, supra note 24, at 82.
26. Id. at 80-83.
27. In Petermann, 184 Cal. App. 2d at 188, 344 P.2d at 27, the court stated that
"the right to discharge an employee ... may be limited by statute or by considerations
of public policy." (emphasis added). Additionally, in Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 173, 610
P.2d at 1333, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 842, the court seemed to suggest that "public policy" may
be determined by the concept of "sound morality."
28. Tameny, 27 Cal. 3d at 179 n.12, 610 P.2d at 1337 n.12, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 846 n.12.
29. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980).
applied in a wrongful discharge case.3 0 However, the doctrine pro-
vides that "'[t]here is an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in every contract that neither party will do anything which will
injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the
agreement.' "31
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,32 the second of the three
landmark cases, recognized a cause of action for breach of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The theory was ex-
panded to encompass a cause of action for both breach of contract
and tort.33 The court found that termination after eighteen years of
employment, coupled with the employer's failure to abide by its own
employer grievance procedures violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.34 The Cleary court, however, failed to deline-
ate guidelines for determining the circumstances under which the
good faith covenant would justify an employee action for wrongful
discharge.3 5
The Meary case was a dramatic expansion of wrongful discharge
law since it was supported only by dicta in Tameny.36 Cases follow-
ing Cleary have construed the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing much less broadly.3 7
Although the Cleary court failed to enunciate guidelines for future
litigants as to the requisite factors underlying a claim for breach of
30. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 17.
31. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 453, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722,
728 (1980) (emphasis in original) (quoting Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.
2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198, 200 (1958)).
32. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). In Ceary, plaintiff was em-
ployed by defendant for eighteen years allegedly under the terms of an oral contract.
The terms of employment included a regulation expressing the defendant employer's
grievance and discharge policy. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that he was discharged as
a result of his union organizing activities and in violation of defendant's own grievance
and discharge procedures. Id. at 447-48, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
33. Id. at 456-57, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
34. Id. at 455-56, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The court stated that "the longevity of the
employee's service, together with the expressed policy of the employer... preclud[ed]
any discharge of such an employee by the employer without good cause." Id.
35. See Miller & Estes, supra note 24, at 83-97, for a complete discussion of Cleary
and its impact on California wrongful discharge law.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
37. See Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal.
Rptr. 613 (1984) (dismissal of vice president/treasurer employed for three and one half
years pursuant to a stock option agreement expressly defining the employment to be
terminated at will did not support a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing since plaintiff did not establish longevity of employment
or defendant's failure to follow its own policy concerning adjudication of employee dis-
putes); Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 150 Cal. App. 3d 1132, 198 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1983) (dismissal of a male managerial employee of 25 years for cohabitating with a
female employee in violation of an unwritten company fraternization rule did not sup-
port a cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing).
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the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the appellate
court in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,38 established a clear test for such
a determination. The Pugh court, however, refused to base its ruling
on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Instead, the
court relied on a pure contract theory of implied-in-fact promise.
V. IMPLIED-IN-FACT PROMISE
The theory of implied-in-fact promise, although not as widely ac-
cepted as the public policy exception to employment at will, "is po-
tentially [the most] pervasive and perilous" 39 of the three theories
recognized in California. In essence, the doctrine enables courts to
examine the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding an employ-
ment relationship to determine whether an express or implied-in-fact
promise existed, limiting the employer's ability to terminate the em-
ployee at will.40
Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc.,41 the third of the three landmark cases,
acknowledged a cause of action based on implied-in-fact promise.
The court's analysis was significant in that it treated the California
labor statute42 as being a mere presumption that employment con-
tracts are terminable at will; such a presumption is rebuttable by an
express or implied agreement to the contrary. 43 Additionally, the
Pugh decision, although relying on contract law, did not require the
traditional contract prerequisites of mutuality of obligation or in-
dependent consideration.44 Instead, the court looked solely to an im-
38. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981).
39. Lopatka, supra note 10, at 17.
40. See Miller & Estes, supra note 24, at 97-102, for a complete discussion of the
theory of implied-in-fact promise.
41. 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). In Pugh, plaintiff had worked
for defendant for thirty-two years and had worked his way up from dishwasher to vice
president in charge of production and a member of the board of directors. Plaintiff
had frequently been told that his future was secure as long as he did a good job and
was loyal to the company. Additionally, it had been the company's policy not to termi-
nate administrative personnel except for good cause. Three months after having been
congratulated for increased production in the company's newsletter, plaintiff was dis-
charged. He was given no explanation for the firing except for a comment that
"[t]hings were said by people in the trade that have come back to us." Id. at 317, 171
Cal. Rptr. at 919. Plaintiff was also told to "look deep within [him]self" to find the
reason for his dismissal. Id.
42. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West Supp. 1985). See supra note 4 for the complete
text of § 2922.
43. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 324-25, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
44. Id. at 325-26, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924-25. The Pugh court stated that "[a] contract
which limits the power of the employer with respect to the reasons for termination is
no less enforcible because it places no equivalent limits upon the power of the em-
plied-in-fact promise to terminate only for "good cause." 45 In so
doing, several factors which may support a cause of action based on
implied-in-fact promise were acknowledged: "the personnel policies
or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, ac-
tions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of
continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which
the employee is engaged."46
Although it was recognized that employers must have discretion in
their termination policies concerning managerial and confidential
employees, 47 Pugh represents a willingness to permit courts to en-
gage in a relatively broad ad hoc inquiry into the existence of an im-
plied-in-fact promise. Consequently, employers must be aware that
any statement to an employee, whether inadvertant or intentional,
whether oral or written, may subsequently be construed by a jury to
be an implied-in-fact promise providing a basis for wrongful dis-
charge liability.
As a result of the recent judicial developments which have sub-
stantially limited the employer's ability to terminate its employees at
will, the employer is faced with a greatly increased risk of liability in
a wrongful discharge action. Statistics have revealed that between
January 1980 and February 1984, plaintiffs have prevailed in approxi-
mately sixty percent of such wrongful discharge actions and have
been awarded punitive damages sixty percent of the time.48 The av-
erage compensatory damage award was $173,050 and the average pu-
nitive damage award was $396,650.49 In light of such statistics,
employers should re-evaluate and restructure their personnel policies
and procedures in order to minimize the risk of defending a wrongful
discharge action, or if necessary, to increase the possibility for a suc-
cessful defense of such an action.
VI. PREVENTATIVE MEASURES
At the outset, it must be noted that an employer can never be
ployee to quit his employment." Id. at 325, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 924. The court addition-
ally stated:
"We embrace the prevailing viewpoint that the general rule (requiring in-
dependent consideration) is a rule of construction, not of substance, and that
a contract for permanent employment, whether or not it is based upon some
consideration other than the employee's services, cannot be terminated at the
will of the employer if it contains an express or implied condition to the
contrary."
Id. at 326, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (emphasis in original) (quoting Drzewiecki v. H & R
Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 3d 695, 703-04, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 174 (1972)).
45. Pugh, 116 Cal. App. 3d at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 927-28.
46. Id. at 327, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 925-26 (footnotes omitted).
47. Id. at 330, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 928.
48. Greenan, The Problems of Wrongful Termination, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1984, at 29.
49. Id.
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guaranteed complete freedom from potential wrongful discharge lia-
bility. However, there are many precautions which can be taken to
help minimize the risk of such liability. Thus, the employer should
carefully review its entire personnel policy from the initial interview
to the final termination proceeding.
A. Hiring Considerations
1. Treatment of Prospective Employees
It is extremely important that the employer decide the type of em-
ployment relationship needed before the hiring process begins. Basi-
cally, an employer has two alternatives: (1) to establish a "good
cause" discharge policy, or (2) to establish a pure at will relation-
ship.5 0 The "good cause" policy may be beneficial for employee mo-
rale, which may, in turn, lead to a more efficient work environment.
However, such a policy invites a jury to second guess the employer as
to what constitutes "good cause." On the other hand, an employment
at will policy may produce morale problems which, in turn, may lead
to greater inefficiency, while at the same time affording the employer
greater discretion in its termination decisions.
After the employer has chosen a viable employment policy, it be-
comes important to establish an organized hiring process. What oc-
curs between the employer's hiring coordinator and a prospective
employee during this process may force the employer into an unde-
sired employment relationship.
First, the employer should thoroughly screen all applicants. Prior
work history should be carefully researched and references should
always be contacted. The employer, by doing so, may discover
trouble areas before the employment relationship begins.
Second, management must instruct those involved in the hiring
process to refrain from making any comments to an applicant which
may imply an employment policy different from the one desired.S1
Inadvertant remarks by an interviewer may provide an otherwise at
will employee with the basis for a successful lawsuit upon termina-
50. Connolly, Murg & Scharman, Abrogating the Employment-At-Will Doctrine:
Implications for an Employer's Personnel Policies and Handbooks, 2 PREVENTIVE L.
REP. 53, 55 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Connolly].
51. For example, if the employer desires to preserve an at will employment rela-
tionship, interviewers should be instructed to not say such things as "'You will have a
job as long as you do your work' or even 'as long as you perform satisfactorily.' "
Moon, Avoiding Liability for Wrongful Discharge-Management Planning and Liti-
gation Tactics, 62 MICH. B.J. 780 (1983).
tion. In light of this possibility, an employer may want to provide
checklists for each interviewer with instructions not to stray from
the policies set forth in that checklist. Also, each interviewer should
be instructed to thoroughly explain the employer's policies to each
applicant.
One other trouble area involves employment applications. These
applications should be reviewed to detect any express or implied em-
ployment guarantees not specifically intended by the employer. It
may also be desirable to insert a disclaimer into the application form.
Such a disclaimer would emphasize that the employment is to remain
at will.52
2. The Employment Agreement
Even more important than the safeguards set forth above are the
terms and conditions agreed upon by the employer and employee at
the time of hire. It is essential that the employee completely under-
stand the type of employment relationship into which he or she is en-
tering. The employer may choose one of several methods in which to
accomplish such an understanding.
First, an employer may create a disclaimer. The disclaimer may
specify an at will relationship. Also, the disclaimer should state that
the at will provision is binding and that no other written or oral
statements may be interpreted as superseding that provision. The
employer should have the employee read and sign the disclaimer
before beginning work. Disclaimers should be placed in bold print in
employment applications, 5 3 employee handbooks and manuals.54 It
52. For a more thorough discussion of disclaimers, see infra notes 53-54 and ac-
companying text.
53. A successful disclaimer was included in a Sears employment application in
Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980):
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules and regu-
lations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can
be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any time,
at the option of either the Company or myself. I understand that no store
manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other than the president
or vice-president of the Company, has any authority to enter into any agree-
ment for employment for any specified period of time, or to make any agree-
ment contrary to the foregoing.
Id. at 346 (emphasis in original).
Recently, a California Court of Appeal in Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors,
152 Cal. App. 3d 467, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1984), determined a disclaimer in a stock op-
tion agreement to be valid:
Nothing in this Stock Option Agreement or in the Plan shall confer upon the
Employee any right to continue in the employ of the Trust or the Advisor or
shall interfere with or restrict in any way the rights of the Trust or the Advi-
sor, which are hereby expressly reserved, to discharge the Employee at any
time for any reason whatsoever, with or without good cause.
Id. at 473 n.1, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 616 n.1 (emphasis in original).
54. A sample disclaimer for use in employee handbooks is as follows:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to confirm [sic] to the rules and
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must be noted, however, that although disclaimers are an effective
means of creating and preserving employment policies, they may also
create undesirable morale problems among employees. Additioaally,
disclaimers will only serve as protection against liability for implied-
in-fact promises55 or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.56 Disclaimers will not prevent liability arising from a
public policy theorys7 or a tort action.58
A second alternative is to enter into an employment contract with
the employee. Such contracts should clearly set forth the rights and
liabilities of both parties. If desired, the grounds for terminating the
contract by either party should be expressed; otherwise, the contract
should provide that the employment is to be at will. The contract
should also provide for an inexpensive and convenient method of
resolving disputes, such as binding arbitration. It may also provide
for liquidated damages in the event of breach. As with a disclaimer,
the employment contract should state that it alone reflects the bar-
gain of the parties and that no other oral or written statement may
supersede its provisions.
The employer should be aware, however, of the possible disadvan-
tages of using a contract. Statistical studies indicate that California
juries are sympathetic to employees in wrongful discharge actions.59
Thus, an employment at will contract is likely to be viewed as uncon-
scionable or as a contract of adhesion,60 since the employer is usually
regulations set forth in this booklet, and that my employment and compensa-
tion can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at
any time, at the option of either the company or myself. I understand that no
representative of the company, other than its president, has any authority to
enter into any agreement for employment for any specified period of time, or
to make any agreement contrary to the foregoing.
Moon, supra note 51, at 780-81, for additional sample disclaimers.
55. For a discussion of implied-in-fact promise, see supra notes 39-47 and accompa-
nying text.
56. For a discussion of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, see supra
notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
57. For a discussion of public policy theory, see supra notes 21-28 and accompany-
ing text.
58. In addition to the three prevailing wrongful discharge theories, public policy
violation, implied-in-fact promise, and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
employers are liable under various ancillary tort theories. See, e.g., Pirre v. Printing
Devs. Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (defamation); Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
Co., 461 F. Supp. 894 (D.N.J. 1978) (intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions); Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1980) (intentional
infliction of emotional distress); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616
P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980) (negligent infliction of emotional distress).
59. See supra note 48-49 and accompanying text.
60. A contract of adhesion is "[a] standardized contract, imposed and drafted by
in a superior position to bargain with the employee.
An alternative to both a disclaimer and an employment contract is
an employee statement. 61 The statement should be read and signed
by the employee. However, the employee statement may be vulnera-
ble to interpretation as an adhesion contract, as is an employment
contract.
In addition to memorializing the agreement of the parties, an em-
ployer must review its employee handbooks and manuals to avoid
guarantees of only "just cause" terminations. Courts are likely to
construe provisions in handbooks and manuals as binding against the
employer.62
It is also important to expressly state that the employment manual
is to be non-contractual. 63 If termination procedures are discussed,
the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates to the other party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or to reject it .... Murphy, A Review of Per-
sonnel Policies and Procedures for At-Will Employees, 3 CAL. Bus. L. REP. 113, 114
(1982).
61. An example of an employee statement is as follows:
Employee Statement
Note: This is a legal document. Do not sign it unless you have read and un-
derstand the entire statement and agree that its contents are true.
I, (Employee Name), having been hired as an employee of (Employer
Name), (the company) as of (date), hereby certify that:
1. I understand that I am not being hired for any definite period of time.
Even though I will be paid my wages on a (weekly, monthly, etc.) basis, I un-
derstand that this does not mean I am being hired for a definite period of
time.
2. I understand that because I am not being hired for any definite period of
time, I will be an employee at will and I can be fired at any time, with or
without cause, for any reason which does not violate a public policy of this
state. I also understand that I may leave my job at any time for any reason
provided I first give at least two (2) weeks notice to the personnel office.
3. I understand that company policy requires me to be hired as an employee
at will and that this policy cannot be changed except in a written document
signed by me and the (appropriate offwer) of the company.
4. I have been given an opportunity to ask questions regarding company
rules and my status as an employee at will. No representative of (em-
ployer name) has made any promises or other statements to me which imply
that I will be employed under any other terms than stated above.
5. I agree that all disputes relating to my employment with the company or
the termination thereof shall be submitted to arbitration before an arbitrator
who is a member of the American Arbitration Association. I understand that
I may be represented by counsel in such proceedings and I agree that arbitra-
tion shall be the exclusive method of resolving all disputes relating to my em-
ployment with the company or the termination thereof
Executed at (city), California, County of - on (date),
(employee signature).
Id. at 115 (emphasis in original).
62. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892 (1980) (a legally enforceable promise could arise from statements made at the
time of hire or from statements contained in an employee manual).
63. If the manual or handbook contains a section on employment terminations,
the employer should include a provision such as the following: "This section on em-
ployee termination has been drafted for the guidance of supervisory employees. It is
not intended that it shall form a contract between the Company and its employees.
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the employer should reserve for itself broad discretion preserving
"the right to terminate for 'any reason not prohibited by law' or for
'any legitimate business reason.' 64
If the employer decides to revise its handbooks and manuals to
more clearly reflect a particular employment policy, signatures from
all present employees should be obtained. Obtaining such signatures
may prevent possible liability arising from previous provisions imply-
ing greater employment security than intended. It is also wise to pro-
vide for salary or benefit increases to those having signed an
acknowledgment of the new revisions. Such increased benefits or
salaries may provide consideration for the new agreement.65
B. The Ongoing Employment Relationship
Employers can do much to reduce the risk of potential litigation
through an organized program involving employee evaluations and
disciplinary procedures. An organized program is important to en-
sure that employees are treated equally and fairly. Evaluations
should always be honest and candid, and should indicate both the
strengths and weaknesses of the employee. Each evaluation should
be in writing and should be reviewed by a superior before being dis-
closed to the employee. The evaluation should be signed by the em-
ployee and placed on file with the employer. Such evaluations are an
important defense in cases of wrongful discharge actions since they
can provide a record by which to justify the employee's termination.
A practice of discipline and warning before termination can also
prove effective in avoiding employer liability for wrongful discharge.
First, an employee who receives counselling or warnings may im-
prove his or her performance, thereby avoiding termination alto-
gether. Even if the employee fails to improve, records of disciplinary
Rather, it describes Company's general philosophy concerning termination decisions."
Baxter, Managing the Risks in Firing Employees, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1983, at 20, col.
1.
64. Id,
65. As an added precaution, employees could be required to sign a contract such as
the following:
In consideration for the __ dollar salary increase for 19-, the parties
mutuall [sic] understand and agree that the employment shall be terminable
at the will of either party and without notice or warning. This contractual
provision shall supercede [sic] and all preexisting employment contracts, per-
sonnel policies, oral promises, and unilateral understandings that the employ-
ment relationship may be terminated only for cause or only after certain
procedures have been followed.
Connolly, supra note 50, at 56.
efforts will show good faith on the part of the employer. However,
an employer must be careful to be discrete when engaging in disci-
pline, since any accidental publication to a third person may possibly
result in a defamation action.
C. Termination
Once the necessity of termination arises, the employer must be
careful to avoid conduct which might become actionable. The em-
ployer should take precautions to avoid angering, hurting or humili-
ating the employee. Termination, in itself, may be a very painful
process for the employee.
First, the termination decision should be reviewed by an impartial
reviewer who has knowledge of the law and who has authority to
overturn an ill-advised termination. The reviewer should be aware of
the possible danger areas which are likely to result in litigation. A
checklist of possible pitfalls should be compiled.66 An independent
review of each termination decision will not only reduce suspicious
terminations, but will also indicate to a judge or jury that the em-
ployer has acted in good faith.
Once a termination decision has been evaluated, it should be com-
municated to the employee in the most delicate manner possible.
The employee should be informed by a disinterested supervisor in
person, not in writing. The employee should briefly be informed of
the reasons underlying the termination, and should be given an op-
portunity to express his feelings regarding the matter. However,
under no circumstances should this opportunity be allowed to de-
velop into a shouting match. The supervisor should be compassion-
ate, yet firm, and the termination decision must be disclosed to the
66. A checklist of problem areas should include:
1. Any statutory violations, such as age, race, or sex discrimination.
2. Whether there have been representations made to the employee that may
reasonably be interpreted to imply an employment relationship other than at
will.
3. Whether all provisions stated in the employee handbook have been com-
plied with.
4. Whether there are any possible violations of public policy (for example,
has the employee been asked to engage in any unlawful activities, or has the
employee recently exercised an unpopular legal right?).
5. Has the employee been warned or disciplined?
6. Is there any good reason for the employee's poor job performance?
7. What is the overall job record of the employee?
8. Has the employee just returned to work from a leave of absence involving
sickness or disability?
9. How long has the employee been employed?
Swerdlow, Wrongful Discharge: A California Management Labor Lawyer's Perspec-
tive and Preventive Recommendations, PREVENTIVE L. REP. 26, 28 (1983). See also
Baxter, Managing the Risks in Firing Employees, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 12, 1983, at 21, col.
1.
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employee in private to avoid humiliation, anger, and a possible defa-
mation lawsuit.
During the exit interview, the employer may obtain a separation
agreement. A separation agreement releases the employer from any
and all liability it may otherwise have to the employee. In exchange,
the employer must tender to the employee some form of considera-
tion, such as severance pay. It is necessary to inform the employee
that he or she is not obliged to sign the agreement, and it is necessary
to insure that the employee realizes that by signing the agreement
the employee is giving up all possible claims against the employer.
The problem associated with using a separation agreement is that it
may educate the employee as to his or her rights and might indicate
to the employee that the employer has a guilty conscience. There-
fore, the employer must carefully weigh the benefits and the risks in-
volved in adopting such a policy.
VII. CONCLUSION
In light of the recent changes in California wrongful termination
law,67 employers are faced with an ever growing uncertainty as to
when an employee may be discharged without incurring liability.
Since these laws are constantly evolving, an employer should remain
informed of current law both in California and in other jurisdictions.
The employer should engage in preventive measures which reflect,
as much as possible, current decisions in this area. The employer's
actions should include thoroughly delineating the employment rela-
tionship, carefully following an established graduated disciplinary
procedure, and terminating an employee only as a last resort. Above
all, the employer should strive toward a system which treats all em-
ployees equally and fairly. An employee who feels he has been
treated fairly will be less likely to initiate a lawsuit in the event of
termination.
TERESA HOWELL SHARP
67. See supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.

